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CHAPTER 24 
FROM SCIENTIFIC 
RACISM TO NEOLIBERAL 
BIOPOLITICS 
Using Foucault's Toolkit 
LADELLE MCWHORTER 
CRITICS have accused Michel Foucault of disempowering his readers by leaving them with 
no sense of political direction (Foucault 1994, 234). His genealogical analyses simply analyze, 
and his bleak depictions of interlocking and mutually reinforcing power relations provide 
no instructions for action and no hope for effecting change. Why, then, should social justice 
advocates and antiracists in particular bother to explore his work? Foucault responded to 
this charge: 
Critique doesn't have to be the premise of a deduction that concludes, "this, then, is what 
needs to be done:· It should be an instrument for those who fight, those who resist and refuse 
what is. Its use should be in processes of conflict and confrontation, essays in refusal. It doesn't 
have to lay down the law for the law. It isn't a stage in a programming. It is a challenge directed 
to what is. (Foucault 1994, 236) 
Genealogy does not pose as political motivation, let alone moral imperative. It is a tool for 
those already engaged in resistance-not to dictate action but to enrich ongoing processes 
of analyzing and strategizing. With that understanding of genealogy's role, as I have argued 
(McWhorter 2009) and will argue here, Foucault's method can be extremely useful for con-
fronting racism. In particular, his concepts of normalization and biopower are crucial for 
understanding how racism survived the demise of the nineteenth-century science that sup-
ported it and how it persisted throughout the twentieth century despite social, political, and 
economic change. 
FOUCAULT'S METHOD 
...................................................................................................................................................................................... 
Genealogical work emphasizes contingency and complexity, as Colin Koopman puts it 
(Koopman 2013, chapter 3). It assumes that whatever phenomena it problematizes were 
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formed in the forces of history rather than given throughout time and universally (Foucault 
1998, 376). Racism, a genealogist would therefore assume, exists only in its various historical 
manifestations in (usually institutionalized) practices, including the rationalizing practices 
that give those practices their sense, and it changes as networks of power change. Despite its 
contingency, however, racism is a remarkably persistent feature of our cultural landscape. 
From a genealogical perspective, then, we must wonder, What gives racism that ability to 
persist, its apparent transhistorical stability? This is the question genealogy investigates. 
A genealogist of racism looks first for moments when racism's operations seem unfamiliar, 
for what Foucault calls "a breach of self-evidence" (1994, 226). In their modern origins, ideas 
of race soon became coextensive with what theorists today view as racism, so in considering 
such breaches, we can begin with "race:' In the eighteenth century race named lineal descent 
and tradition, not appearance, and there were as many races as there were clans or tribes. Only 
in the nineteenth century did it become primarily a matter of physical appearance. Later, after 
it became an object of science, race came to mean an essentially temporal and developmental 
phenomenon rather than either a given morphology or a matter of familial descent. Scientific 
studies of race quickly became hierarchical taxonomies that privileged white Europeans and 
that gave rise to the eugenics movement, which was then disrupted by both political and sci-
entific events in the 1930s. After World War II, racism began to be treated as a hallmark of 
ignorance and then as a deep-seated psychological trait, as opposed to a rationally communi-
cable belief system. In this new intellectual climate, arguments could be made against (some) 
racist laws and practices, and civil rights movements for oppressed minorities and under-
classes gained traction. Whereas racism had once been the avowed position of respected 
elites, it was now the pernicious fantasy of the ignorant or sick, and the way to fight it was 
through education, therapy, and moral suasion. If we study the transformations in power that 
occurred surrounding these various shifts, we may develop an understanding of racism that 
will inspire new and possibly more effective strategies for com batting it. 
What realignments of forces-institutions, practices, theories, values, eruptive event& 
effected such shifts? Having identified breaches of self-evidence, historical moments when 
big shifts in practices seem to have occurred, the genealogist seeks the multiplicity of "con-
nections, encounters, supports, blockages, plays of forces, strategies, and so on, that at a 
given moment establish what subsequently counts as being self-evident, universal, and nec-
essary" (Foucault 1994, 226-227). The goal is to produce a description of forces surround-
ing these disruptions of continuity. Very likely this effort will lead outside the field in which 
the "object" occurs. Foucault notes, for example, that his study of imprisonment practices in 
Discipline and Punish led to analysis of schooling, military discipline, and so on (Foucault 
1994, 227; 1978). Foucault's research trajectory followed practical concerns that had gener-
ated disciplinary regimes that practitioners then articulated in abstract, communicable 
terms. This facilitated importation of those practices and their rationalities to other domains 
(imprisonment practices being only one), and the overall result has been an archive for gene-
alogists to exploit. 
Genealogy is thus analytic and diagnostic. Its discoveries implicitly suggest where we 
might focus our attention by revealing the points at which a network of power is, despite its 
appearance of invulnerability, potentially unstable, thus providing clues for how to trans-
form the practices that shape us. Genealogy is not inherently normative in the sense of advo-
cating a set of values and a plan of action. It is a tool for those who want to formulate values 
and plans, to make change. 
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If we want to dismantle the institutions and practices that are racism today, taking up the 
genealogical tool means, first, looking at these moments where racism, while recognizable 
in some degree, is differently manifested. The rise of scientific racism is one such moment 
in comparison with racisms informed by the lineal concept of race that preceded it (see 
McWhorter 2009, 55-62). Subsequently we can identify others, such as eugenics and prac-
tices of surveillance, control, and normalization that have endured through neoliberalism. 
A GENEALOGICAL FRAGMENT: THE PREHISTORY 
OF SCIENTIFIC "RACE,, 
Our genealogy might begin as the eighteenth century drew to a close, with the onset of con-
vergence among disparate practices that would, along with a series of political events, soon 
generate what we now call scientific racism. Among them were three: (1) the overturning 
of the theory of preformation and its replacement with a version of epigenesis, and subse-
quently, the biological theory that ontogeny recapitulates phylogeny, (2) the question of 
human diversity in comparative anthropology, and (3) the problematization of the slave 
trade and then slavery as an American institution. These three different sets of events sup-
ported a shift in the meaning of race from lineal descent to morphology; race became less a 
matter of ancestry and more a matter of visible embodiment as it was affected by environ-
mental factors. That is, races could be classified by direct observation and their observed 
differences explained by ancient patterns of migration to different climates (see Kant 2000, 
13ff; Smith 1965). 
Not until the twentieth century was there a concept of culture as plural-as in the relatively 
recent concept of"multiculturalism:' Instead, anthropologists spoke of civilization, a unitary 
phenomenon. Some racialized groups lived according to the standards of civilization, and 
some did not. Anthropologists used the newly prevailing concept of race-human bodies in 
long-term interaction with climate-to explain this observed "fact": Comfortable climates 
present few challenges and require little innovation for survival; consequently, sophisticated 
forms of technology and government never emerge in them. It just so happened that almost 
all dark-skinned peoples inhabited congenial climates (the brown "Laplanders" were an 
explicable exception), while whites inhabited harsh ones. Voila, morphology and civilization 
converged (Jefferson 1944, 88; Kant 2000, 17). 
This convergence presupposed an earlier scientific controversy between epigenesis, the 
view that living matter actually organizes itself into new configurations; and preformation-
ism, the idea that, while lhing matter grows or declines, it cannot change its form, which was 
resolved by the nineteenth century in favor of epigenesis (Miiller-Sievers 1997, 28, 38-41). 
With the triumph of epigenesis, natural historians began to find developmental forces 
inherent in matter itself, allo\\ing lhing matter to change in response to emironmen-
tal conditions. Thus natural history ga\'e way to the new science of biology, the science of 
life. Among the many ideas that appeared upon this transformation was anatomist Carl 
Friedrich Kielmeyer's suggestion that stages of mammalian fetal development replicate the 
adult morphologies of other creatures. His claim inspired Johann von Autenrieth, who held 
that higher mammals (e.g., humans) exhibit the morphologies of lower animals (e.g., fish) 
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on their way to expressing their species-appropriate forms, a view later encapsulated in the 
phrase "ontogeny recapitulates phylogeny:' In other words, lower animals are but living 
stages of higher animals' development in utero; higher animals thus coexist alongside the 
living forms they have surpassed (Gould 1977. 126). 
Biologists' attention to fetal development was paralleled by a new attention to develop-
ment in the emerging field of comparative anthropology. Based on a collection of "speci-
mens" from Africa, Tasmania, and Australia in 1800, European anthropologists held that 
peoples in different parts of the world differ anatomically in such features as arm length rela-
tive to height, genital size, and most important, cranial capacity. Anthropologists used this 
new collection, in addition to Blumenbach's eighteenth-century collection, as the basis not 
only for typological theories but also for a developmental theory of racial difference (Gould 
1977. 82-107, 122-142). 
Anatomical differences between groups. already understood as the effects of environ-
ment, were now seen as indications of more and less developmental progress. In warm, 
fertile areas where little effort is required to feed oneself and little preparation for seasonal 
changes is necessary, people did not develop large brains and therefore had relatively small 
crania. In cold, harsh climates where lack of foresight and hard work results in death by star-
vation, people developed large brains and had large crania. Beyond serving as an indicator 
of racial difference, then, cranial capacity became a measure of both differential intellectual 
and social racial development. This measure also indicated that women are less developed 
than the men of their respective race, and it bespoke race and sex differences in the capacity 
to solve problems, exercise sound judgment and self-control, and in general govern one's 
own life and the lives of others. New anthropological theories of race suggested that the 
peoples of Africa and the Southern Hemisphere were simply less intellectually and morally 
capable than (male) peoples in Northern Europe and, hence, less civilized {Jefferson 1944; 
Kant 2000). 
The new biology and the new anthropology reinforced each other, giving rise to a wide-
spread belief, among educated Europeans and North Americans, that adult white males were 
not merely physically different from, but more and better developed than white children and 
females, and nonwhite peoples everywhere. When the American institution of chattel slav-
ery came under fire in the nineteenth century, these theories were marshaled to lend it sci-
entific defense and through repetition in public discourse gained wide currency even among 
less educated whites. The "lower" races had to be kept under close surveilJance and super-
\ision, so the thinking went, because they were like the children of the "higher" races in 
terms of their cognitive abilities and capacity to delay gratification. Freedom for them would 
he disastrous, because they would act on impulse, without considering consequences. They 
would not be able to take care of themselves. Worse still, they would pose a danger to whites, 
just as gangs of unsupervised adolescents tend to run amok, respecting neither property nor 
persons (see Fitzhugh 1960; Wish 1960; Connor 1965; Muhammad 2010, 17-20). 
No one at the time called this body of work "scientific racism." That appellation was coined 
in the twentieth century to name something that social and biological scientists were inter-
ested in repudiating. In the nineteenth century, on the contrary, what we now call "scientific 
racism" was, simpl}; science-scientific study of the perceived anatomical and social differ-
ences across human groups. Its practitioners were among the most renowned scholars and 
experimentalists of their time such as Samuel George .Morton, fosiah Nott, George Glidden, 
and Louis Agassiz. Among their influential works were Morton's 1839 Cra11ia Americana and 
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1844 Crania Aegyptiaca and Nott and Glidden's 1854 Types of Mankind (see Fredrickson 1971, 
77; Brace 2005, So). Yet, by the mid-twentieth century, this body of work was the object of 
ridicule and condemnation. Things-power relations-had shifted dramatically. Here is 
another moment for genealogical analysis. 
Two CONCEPTS: NORMALIZATION AND BIOPOWER 
At this point in the analysis, we do well to employ two concepts that Foucault introduced 
in his genealogies of modern incarceration and sexuality: normalization and biopower. 
"Normalization" is a set of management techniques that became ubiquitous over the course 
of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. They grew out of disciplinary techniques adapted 
from monastic practices for pedagogy and military training. Adaptation for the military 
occurred, according to Foucault in Discipline and Punish, when authorities in Europe began 
to conscript soldiers from the peasantry rather than exclusively from the nobility. Warriors 
were no longer born but were made out of ordinary bodies. Recruits required discipline. 
New techniques enabled military leaders to treat bodies as sets of movable parts that could 
be trained through graduated exercises to interact in ways conducive to both good soldiering 
and strict obedience to commanders (Foucault 1978, 138). Bodies were effectively machines 
that could be retooled. Over time, however, trainers realized that not all bodies responded to 
these techniques. Some just could not manage a rifle, march in time, or follow instructions. 
Similarly, educators discovered that no matter how carefully they adjusted their disciplin-
ary practices, some pupils did not conform. Some bodies were stubborn; it was as if, unlike 
machines, they had their own internal temporalityof development-as if, as biologists soon 
began to say, living matter had its own inherent principles of self-organization. 
The best option was not to work against these posited forces but to harness and guide 
them. Disciplinarians observed developmental trajectories and kept records from which 
they generated statistical norms. These norms could, in turn, be used to assess and evaluate 
individuals and devise yet more carefully calibrated disciplinary techniques for training out-
liers. Mechanical discipline gave way to normalizing discipline. Development was not only a 
phenomenon to be studied, as biologists at the time were beginning to do; it was a force to be 
managed and a resource to be cultivated (Foucault 2978, 268-169 ). 
Normalizing disciplinary practices swiftly spread-from military camps and schools to 
hospitals and asylums-and it made possible new institutions as well, such as the modern 
mental institution and the prison. Sexuality, conceived not as simple reproductive activ-
ity but as developmental mentality and behavior, came into existence in this midst of this 
explosion of normalizing disciplinary practices, as Foucault demonstrates in 77ie History of 
Sexuality, Volume 1. Sexuality became the engine of much of individual development and, 
through reproduction and family life, the engine of social and species development as well 
(Foucault i980, 68-69). By the end of the nineteenth century, sexuality functioned as both 
guarantor of and greatest danger to each indh;dual's developmental health, as well as the 
reproduction of the next generation. It became, therefore, the managerial key to a vast num-
ber of other aspects of human life; educators, psychiatrists, psychoanalysts, physicians, and 
criminologists (among others) set to work to determine its norms in order to control and 
cultivate its forces. As these techniques took hold, all sorts of governmental institutions 
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began to make human life "itself,' that is, the vital processes that characterized their popula-
tions, the target of power-hence Foucault's term "biopower:' The analytic value of these two 
concepts will be evident in our next genealogical fragment. 
ANOTHER GENEALOGICAL FRAGMENT: EUGENICS 
These techniques, which included surveillance and data gathering, conditioned and were 
conditioned by the sciences of the time. Scientific racism, rapidly assimilating Darwin's evo-
lutionary theory, promoted the idea that Northern Europeans and their American descen-
dants were at the forefront of human development, far superior in intellect, self-control, and 
physical fitness to their "Asiastic;' "Indian;' "Negro;' and "Mediterranean" contemporaries, 
who represented stages of evolution that whites had long surpassed. Northern Europeans 
had become superior because of the pressures of the environments where they had evolved. 
Cold, harsh climates killed individuals who lacked the physical strength, intellectual abil-
ity, and self-restraint to work and plan ahead for winter scarcity, leaving only those who 
were "fit" for that climate to survive and propagate. Warm, inviting climates produced no 
such pressure, so the stupid and the impulsive could flourish and prevail. However, in the 
midst of new techniques for managing individual development, science gave reasons for 
concern regarding racial development, which they understood as coextensive with human 
development. 
Evolutionary conditions had obviously changed. First, Northern Europeans were not 
confined to Northern Europe anymore, but had spread over the globe, where many inhab-
ited warm and fertile climates. Furthermore, Europeans' and Euro-Americans' superior 
technologies had made their lives much easier; steam and coal engines made production less 
taxing, and medicine allowed even the weak to survive and reproduce. Their Christian mor-
als led them to pity the less well endowed and provide for them what they could not provide 
for themselves, thereby further increasing the number of those who would have perished 
in former times. In short, the evolutionary pressure was off. And that "fact," coupled with 
the "fact" that descendants of Northern Europeans now lived among members of the "lower 
races" with whom some of them might mate (voluntarily or im•oluntarily as the result of the 
latter's impulsive violence), inspired fear that human evolution was about to come to a grind-
ing halt. The white race was committing suicide. 
Titls fear might have remained confined to scientifically educated elites, had it not been for 
a number of other events that affected a broader swath of the population in the United States 
and Western Europe. Labor leaders were interested in curbing the influx of immigrants to 
keep wages up. The alleged developmental inferiority of Asians and Southern and Eastern 
Europeans cemented an otherwise unlikely alliance between a professional class and labor 
unions (Reilly 1991, 23-24). Capitalists feared Eastern European immigrants would bring 
with them anarchism and communism and stir up trouble that would threaten their busi-
ness interests. Immigration restrictions enacted in the United States, Canada, and Western 
Europe through the early twentieth century accorded \\;th several agendas, as well as sci-
ence. Local governmental officials were interested in reducing the number of beggars and 
drifters; scientific racism pro .. ;ded them \\;th arguments for state and federal spending on 
institutions to confine such people and sex-segregate them so they could not produce more 
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mouths to feed (Carlson 2001, 188-194). Reformers wanted to clean up tenements, rescue 
children from negligent parents, and minister to the mentally ill, which pitted them against 
slum lords, reluctant governments, and taxpayers, but the new concern with bettering the 
human race gave them momentum. When financial constraints dashed with goals of such 
"racial hygiene;' resourceful reformers sought legislation to allow, instead oflifelong institu-
tionalization, mass sterilization of the poor, the immoral, the mentally ill, and the cognitively 
disabled, all of whom were now seen as drags on human evolution. We see a similar alliance 
between race science and the birth control movement. Disparate though these movements 
and concerns were, they coalesced to produce new social and political practices that contrib-
uted to twentieth-century eugenics (Bruni us 2006; McWhorter 2009, 203-230 ). 
Sexuality was key to racial discipline, to the management of human evolution for the 
purpose of "fitness" and "betterment;' just as it was to individual development and malde-
velopment. Eugenicists sought to control the sexuality of "inferior individuals" to prevent 
inferiority from reproducing itself. The aim was to protect the white nuclear family and 
the future, "better" population whose birth depended upon it (Smith and Nelson 1989, 
234; Kline 1997, l06ff; Carlson 2001, 204-214). At the movement's height, eugenic rhetoric 
infused virtually all public discourse in industrialized countries. Purging the human race 
of inferior "germ plasm" through managed sexuality was a progressive enterprise, the new 
heart of social reform. This was the first major consolidation of "biopower" (Foucault 1978, 
140 ); the target of the exercise of power on a massive scale was human biological existence. 
Then came Hitler. Eugenics opponents were quick to point out the similarities-indeed, 
the continuity-between domestic eugenics policies and Hitler's campaigns against the dis-
abled and the non-"Aryan:' Eugenics' progress stalled as policymakers grew reluctant to be 
perceived as "Hitlerite:' Social and biological scientists began distancing their work from 
their forebears'. "New" developments in genetics (some of which were already thirty years 
old) were brought forward to undercut eugenicist positions and proposals (Larson 1995, 147; 
Carlson 2001, 285; McWhorter 2009, 231-244). 
In response, the movement changed tactics. American Eugenics Society President 
Frederick Osborn embraced the new science, which showed that, statistically, there was 
actually more variation of genotypes within groups than between them. "[I]it would be 
unwise for eugenicists to impute superiorities or inferiorities of a biological nature to social 
classes, to regional groups, or to races as a whole:' he wrote. "Eugenics should therefore 
operate on the basis of individual selection" (Osborn 1937, 106). Eugenicists still believed 
that, on balance, white people were superior, but they admitted that there might be some tit 
Negroes, Jews, and Asiatics. Policies discriminating against entire racial groups were thus 
counterproductive. Eugenicists turned to marriage and then genetics counseling to influ-
ence "natural" selection, meanwhile changing the names of their organizations and publica-
tions. Population management for the betterment of the human race was still their goal, but 
efforts would be focused on influencing indi\idual choice rather than dictating Jaw or policy. 
However, by \'\'orld War II, eugenic \'alues were deeply embedded in popular culture 
in almost all industrialized nations. While the O\'erarching goal of (human) race better-
ment was officially repudiated, bias toward the poor, disabled, and dark-skinned remained 
(Gannett 2001, 490; }.k\\'horter 2009, 245-258). Quite apart from that, however, biopo-
litical techniques of population management had proven extremely useful in furthering a 
wide variety of governmental and financial goals. Keeping populations under sun·eillance 
and segregating them for productive efficiency and risk reduction were essential means for 
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managing a growing industrial economy. It was necessary to renounce racial "prejudice" 
(officially and scientifically), so steps were taken to disavow "racism;' while surveillance, 
data collection, and population management intensified (Kline 1997, 104 ). 
Production, circulation, and technological progress became more important than race 
betterment. But ideas for achieving those ends were formed in a eugenic era, where it was 
assumed that productive, innovative, and law-abiding individuals matched the profile of the 
supposed evolutionary avant garde: male, "fit" (not disabled), of normal intelligence quo-
tient, heterosexual, and of Northern European descent (Paul 1995, 125; 1998, 142). Such indi-
viduals were produced in households made up of father-headed families with clear gender 
and racial divisions and identities. Thus the biopolitical focus became the individual and his 
or her role in the nuclear family. Immigration restrictions persisted, then, and sterilizations 
continued into the 1970s. But the reasons given (if ever anyone asked) cited individual well-
being and economic benefit. 
"Racism" itself was invented in this process. The term was coined as a means of distin-
guishing good exercises and networks of biopower from bad. Hitler was a racist because, 
unlike Osborn, he assumed all members of the Jewish and Negro races were unfit and treated 
them as such, indiscriminately. According to Osborn's new dicta, he should have judged 
them fit or unfit as individuals. The rhetoric of individuality and the celebration of the indi-
\idualizing nuclear family as the cradle of humanity's future replaced the rhetoric of racial 
hygiene. But institutionalized oppression went largely unchallenged. 
RACISM IN A DISCIPLINARY SOCIETY 
............................................................................................... 0 •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 
The deeply embedded assumption that the heterosexual nuclear family was requisite for nor-
mal development that would lead to success persisted in government, courts, education, and 
medicine. People who did not come from or form such families (and lived in single parent-
hood, homosexual pairing, multigenerational households, or by themselves) were deviant 
and likely dangerous (Goddard 1927, 101). Likewise, poverty was a dear indicator of intellec-
tual or moral developmental failure. But some institutional innovation did occur as a retreat 
from early eugenic racial profiling. In the United States, a new concern for "underprivileged" 
children and a willingness to reconsider Jim Crow emerged in a few corners of public dis-
course (driven in part by the fact that Soviet propaganda used Jim Crow to illustrate the 
hypocrisy of liberal capitalism). Here and there a progressive white person suggested that 
every individual should have an opportunity to prove himself (or even herself), that equal 
opportunity meant that Negro children get the same schooling as whites, or that children of 
the poor needed a "head start" in order to take ad\·antage of the schooling offered to them. 
A booming postwar economy financed programs designed to provide opportunities, and an 
organized civil rights movement coupled with the new technology of television generated 
images of respectable Negroes who asked to be judged not by the color of their skin but by 
the content of their characters (Johnson 2007). 
As long as advocates for social justice-racial or economic (or even sexual)-stuck to the 
normalizing, individualist agenda, their claims could be assimilated to biopolitical networks 
that now permeated liberal capitalism. By contrast, structural analyses got little traction, and 
their advocates were labeled as Communists. Still, as doors opened for many people, racism 
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was declared a thing of the past; only backward people were racists anymore, and society as 
a whole could not be held responsible for their actions or attitudes (Bonilla-Silva 2003, 173). 
Elites made a point of marginalizing those "backward" people and spotlighting members of 
formerly "inferior" racial groups who had seized opportunities and proven themselves nor-
mal people, even individuals of merit. 
Race no longer signified more or less stable stages of human development; indeed, races 
were no longer intellectually or morally homogenous groups. Racism, as it was construed 
when the term was introduced, really did recede into the backwaters; psychologists declared 
it abnormal, the symptom of developmental failure and mental pathology. But the result was 
not racial equality. And it could not have been. The norms by which individuals were to be 
measured had arisen in the context of white supremacy and capitalist production and con-
sumption. Normal human development was modeled on white, Protestant, middle-class, 
heterosexual development, and it was measured by white, mostly Protestant, middle- and 
upper-middle-class, and at least officially heterosexual, clinicians and educators. Moreover, 
the outcomes that proved normal development had occurred were bodied forth in the life-
styles of middle-class white married couples raising normal children. Racist beliefs were 
generally discredited; racist attitudes were generally condemned. But the idea that people 
should be subject to continual surveillance and measurement against developmental norms 
is still firmly in place. Not every member of previously "inferior" races is subject to racial 
"prejudice" at every moment and in every context, as their ancestors were. But at the first sign 
of "abnormality" the old mechanisms of containment and constraint will close in. We live in 
a normalizing society, as Foucault declared. And this fact falls especially hard on anyone who 
does not fit the implicitly white ideal. But that is not what a majority of people believe. 
Most white people and many people of color, at least in the United States, are loath to think 
that white supremacy is an inherent feature of our capitalist, neoliberal society. Instead, they 
think racial inequalities linger because some whites still judge individuals by their racial 
identities rather than their personal merit. Perhaps unconsciously or secretly, twenty-first-
century whites really do believe old-style scientific racist tenets. The answer, therefore, is 
more moral exhortation, more education, or elimination of all such people from positions of 
authority-more of what has been done for the last sixty years. Those strategies did combat 
some forms of racism and did make many people's lives much better. But their efficacy has 
empirically obvious limits. By revealing the power of normalization rather than veiled scien-
tific racism at the center of many contemporary racist effects, genealogical analysis suggests 
a different approach. What must be dismantled is not a belief system or even individual atti-
tudes; it is normalizing discipline and its accompanying practices ofbiopower. The solution 
is not to raise everybody to acceptable standards of normality; it is to undermine normality's 
power to dictate the terms of human lives. 
RACISM AND NEOLIBERALISM 
Much has changed since Foucault's analyses of normalization and biopower in the 1970s. It 
would be foolish not to take genealogical account of that change, some of which, remark-
ably, Foucault himself anticipated. In his lecture series at the College de France in 1979 
(Foucault 2008, 317), he discussed a phenomenon just then emerging, which, follo\\ing 
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Milton Friedman, he termed "neoliberalism:' Since i979, neoliberalism has become the pre-
vailing mode of governing in capitalist countries and their client states. Whatever race and 
racism are in the twenty-first century, they are undoubtedly deeply marked by neoliberal-
ism, for if they were not they could not persist in this transformed political and social ter-
rain. To understand and counter the racism we face, we must analyze this new formation of 
biopower. 
Foucault traces neoliberalism to reactions against governments' taking on the well-being 
of their populations as a central function, as was supposedly done in enactment of the 
Beveridge Report in Great Britain, the New Deal in the United States, and during German 
reconstruction after World War II (Foucault 2008, chapters 5-7, 9). Neoliberals held that 
government's central function is to provide the national security and legal structure to insure 
contracts. It should not regulate prices, markets, or industries; provide consumer or envi-
ronmental or worker protections; or guarantee people education, health care, or jobs. The 
market will take care of all those things if governments refrain from interfering. Moreover, 
government assets beyond those absolutely essential for functioning of security, courts, 
and legislatures should be privatized. In a booming economy, Keynesian economic policies 
remained in force, but once the postwar economy stagnated, neoliberalism got a hearing, 
and neoliberals were elected to office. Their policies set in motion a global movement whose 
new normal now pervades capitalist society discursively and, to a great extent, politically 
and legally as well (Mirowski and Plehwe 2009 ). 
Neoliberalism valorizes competition and individualizes both failure and success; moral 
worth is equated with competitive success in material terms. To this extent, it replicates the 
major features of disciplinary normalization. But there are differences, two of which will suf-
fice as illustration. For capitalism to expand beyond colonization of previously noncapitalist 
regions, consumers' desires must expand and diversify. A diversity of cultures fosters a diver-
sity of desires, especially if one set of cultural consumables can be marketed to members of 
other cultures as a new fashion. Neoliberal individualism differs from the individualization 
of normalizing discipline, therefore, in that it encourages (some) divergence from norms. 
Gay is good if it presents a demand for specialized vacations. Black is beautiful if it sells 
sneakers and baggy jeans. Neoliberalism encourages departures from the norm as long as 
they can be construed as matters of taste and those exhibiting them are moneyed enough to 
function as consumers. Industrialized production required rigorous discipline on a massive 
scale; postindustrial consumption requires a certain (controlled) lack of discipline. A gene-
alogy of racism in the twenty-first century would need to identify the points at which nor-
malizing discipline retreats and those at which it remains in force, and how that happens. 
A second illustrative difference concerns the fate of those who are not moneyed enough 
to consume-an increasingly large number as neolibcralism makes possible a striking new 
concentration of wealth. Industrial production absorbed enormous numbers of people 
as laborers. Neoliberalism does not need nearly so many of them. If they have no income 
streams other than that generated by labor, there is no place for them. They are not drags on 
e\'olution, but they may be drags on the econom); especially if their poverty drives them to 
steal or riot. 
Any analysis of racial oppression in the present day must take account of these changes-
of the new ways in which nonwhite populations and cultures can be and sometimes arc 
treasured and of the ways in which both nonwhite and white populations can be simply 
abandoned, incarcerated, or othen\'ise "encouraged" to pass out of existence. This is not our 
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foreparents' racism, which does not mean that it is not racism at all. It simply means we have 
genealogical work to do before we can formulate the strategies we need to dismantle the 
structures that oppress us. 
CONCLUSION 
Foucault's examination of neoliberalism stopped at 1980, but the tools he provided via con-
cepts such as normalization and biopower and methods such as genealogy can be used 
to study this new racial situation. How useful they will be is an empirical question and a 
question of strategy. What is obvious, however, is that racism cannot be fully understood, 
let alone countered, if we insist that it is merely a matter of individual choices, actions, atti-
tudes, and beliefs. "Both race and racism are profoundly historical:' Angela Davis reminds 
us. Even if biological and essentialist racisms no longer hold sway: "It would be erroneous 
to assume that we can also willfully extricate ourselves from histories of race and racism. 
Whether we acknowledge it or not, we continue to inhabit these histories, which help con-
stitute our social and psychic worlds" (Davis 2012, 169). That is, racism cannot be addressed 
without knowledge of the historical forces that brought us to this point and the biopolitical 
networks that currently enforce it. 
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